Population and Development within the Ecosphere: One View of the Literature by Keyfitz, N.
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE 
ECOSPHERE: ONE VIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Nathan Keyfitz 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria 
RR-91-14 
August 1991 
Reprinted from Population Index 57(1):5-22, Spring 1991. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Research Repons, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently reviewed before 
publication. However, the views and opinions they express are not necessarily those of the 
Institute or the National Member Organizations that support it. 
Reprinted with permission from Population Index 57(1):5-22, Spring 1991. 
Copyright o 1991 Office of Population Research, Princeton University. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or 
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or anyinformation storage 
or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright holder. 
Printed by Novographic, Vienna, Austria 
Preface 
The literature of contemporary neoclassical economics shows little 
handicap to development due to population growth, and some incidental 
advantages. With full employment a larger population means a larger 
economy, and rapid growth of population means more demand. 
Everyone seems to benefit from growth--not only does whatever one is 
making sell better, but one's physical capital (homes for example) is 
worth more with each increment of population, other things equal. It is 
no wonder that growth is well regarded, by the public as well as by those 
analyzing the economy. 
All this is in the short run, and within the framework of models 
that narrowly and exclusively concern development, usually defined as 
increase of GNP per capita. Under modern conditions technology can 
increase agricultural yields so readily that the Malthusian threat seems 
obsolete. And physical capital, required to equip the newcomers to the 
economy, can be generated by an educated labor force. All that is 
needed is human capital, which is to say people, educated people. 
Here is one more case where propositions that are obvious, even 
tautological, in one universe of discourse, are downright absurd on their 
face in a different logical framework. A biologist has a different starting 
point for his logic, and takes a very much longer view; when he looks at 
the economy he sees everything we have and use, all human wealth, as 
made from substances provided by the environment. Human economic 
activity consists in transforming that environment, and the biologist notes 
that there is only a limited amount of it to transform. Nothing is 
destroyed, but many kinds of transformation are one-way only, they are 
irreversible. Moreover when we transform something to our benefit, we 
lll 
often incidentally produce unwanted effects that seriously interfere with 
human life. 
Thus the transformation, say of crude oil into fuel into carbon 
dioxide, that the economist calls production, is called destruction by the 
biologist. With given technology the amount of it that goes on is 
proportional to the number of people who are engaged, which is to say 
the number who have to earn a living, which is to say the number of 
people. Whether one sees increase of those people as positive or 
negative for the planet depends on whether one regards what they are 
doing as production or destruction. 
All this is manifest in the literature, of which the hundred or so 
items referred to in the paper that follows are only a small sample. It 
goes only the shortest distance to reconciling the economic and 
biological points of view, but we hope that by juxtaposing the two we 
have made a small contribution to the work of reconciliation. 
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Abstract 
Contemporary academic economists, unlike those of the nineteenth 
century, find that although population growth and density can have bad 
effects on development, these will only be severe with wrong economic 
policies. Technical advance and substitution in free markets avoid major 
difficulties, for example shortage of materials. But ecologists see the 
poor cutting trees for firewood, the rich pouring carbon into the 
atmosphere, and doubt the capacity of the environment to absorb the 
effects of dense and growing populations and their present technologies. 
On both sides are distinguished scholars, whose writings cannot here be 
covered exhaustively, but only enough said for background to the 
question posed to demographers: Should this central population issue 
not be on our research agendas? 
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Population and Development 
within the Ecosphere: 
One View of the Literature 
--Only the variables put into the 
equation can emerge in the solution. 
The Brundtland Report1 and the Amsterdam Declaration2 are two of 
scores of recent documents and articles expressing a sense of urgency in 
relation to population as well as to the deterioration of the environment; 
the current National Academy of Sciences3 assessment, on the other 
hand, sees few problems in either population or environment that cannot 
be solved by sound economic policies. The report4 of the Special 
Session of the United Nations on Revitalizing Economic Growth in the 
Developing Countries contains 38 paragraphs, of which only two mention 
1 Brundtland, G.H. (Chair). 1987. World commission on environment and 
development. Our Common Future. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
2 Amsterdam Declaration. 1990. Population and Development Review 16(1) 
(March). 
3 National Academy of Sciences. 1971. Rapid Population Growth: Consequences 
and Policy Implications. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
4 Population and Development Review 16(2):379-84 (June 1990). 
1 
2 
population at all, and neither suggests that rapid growth could be a 
problem. Thus the spectrum of official views on the effect of population 
is wide. The present survey presents as much of the spectrum as space 
and the author's knowledge permit. It is concerned with the 
consequences of population change for development rather than the 
converse, taking for granted that once development occurs population 
comes under control--the threat of exponential growth exceeding all 
bounds gives place to the threat of population decline. 
Biologists and many lay writers raise the alarm on what is coming 
if population continues to increase: exhaustion of soils and mass 
starvation, deterioration of the ecosphere to the point where the earth 
is not habitable, or if not that then at the very best declining incomes 
and loss of amenities. On the other side, academic economics, which also 
has a lay following, provides optimistic comfort: with modern ingenuity, 
given scope and stimulus by free markets, all shortages will be overcome, 
all deterioration repaired. Say Bloom and Freeman,5 "the empirical 
evidence shows little relation between the growth of population and 
income per head or related economic variables." The data, as they 
interpret it, support a "population neutral" point of view (p. 58). Not 
population, but artificial constraints on the market, are doing the 
damage. 
The major less-developed countries themselves see population 
control as a main problem. President Soeharto of Indonesia declares 
that: 
The primary objective of the Indonesian Government's 
policy is to reduce the rate of population growth ... .In the 
1978 guidelines for state policy, priori!( was given to 
national family planning to curb fertility. 
The importance of population control is now (after some fluctuations) 
being stressed by the Chinese leaders even more than by the Indonesian. 
5 Bloom, David E., and Richard B. Freeman. 1988. "Economic Development and 
the Timing and Components of Population Growth." Journal of Policy Modeling 
10(1):57-81. 
6 Jakarta Post, June 1990. 
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India's leaders think the same, and at one point went to the extreme of 
compulsory sterilization. 
A number of writers 7 have provided valuable summaries and 
assessments of the literature that bears on our central question. The 
only addition I can make is to juxtapose in one paper views that arise 
from different perspectives and are meant for different audiences. I 
cannot add to either economic or biological knowledge; my purpose is 
simply to contrast what I read in the two fields. 
In the modern academy, knowledge comes packaged in 
disciplines.8 Within any discipline the machinery for establishing what 
is right (refereed professional journals, etc.) works moderately well most 
of the time; most differences are resolved. But for resolving differences 
between disciplines the machinery is inadequate. Many questions do not 
overlap; since biologists have nothing to say about how a change in the 
discount rate announced by the Federal Reserve Bank will affect the 
value of the dollar in Tokyo, there is nothing here to resolve. But 
7 Including Kelley, Allen C. 1988. "Economic Consequences of Population Change 
in the Third World." Journal of Economic Literature 26(4):1,685-728. 
McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1984. "Consequences of Rapid Population Growth: An Overview 
and Assessment." Population and Development Review 10(2):177-240. 
World Bank. 1984. World Development Report. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
National Research Council. 1986. Population Growth and Economic Development: 
Policy Questions. 
Birdsall, Nancy. 1988. "Economic Approaches to Population Growth and 
Development." In Handbook of Development Economics, edited by Hollis B. Chenery 
and T.N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
King, Timothy. 1985. "Population and Development: Back to First Principles." 
Population Trends and Public Policy 7:2-11 (February). 
Srinivasan, T.N. 1988. "Population Growth and Economic Development." Journal of 
Policy Modeling 10:1 (Spring). 
8 Easton, David. 1991. Divided Knowledge: Across Disciplines, Across Cultures. 
Sage Publications, in press. 
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population does spread over economics, biology, sociology, and other 
disciplines. Separated by different perspectives, each using a language 
not readily comprehensible to outsiders, each with a body of knowledge 
too extensive for most of those not brought up to it to master, and 
offering little premium to the academic who attempts to do so, 
disciplines do not take irreconcilable conclusions seriously, let alone 
resolve them. 
This throws a problem too difficult for science as now organized 
to administrators who must make decisions affecting population and 
environment. They do so by their action in providing budgets or, by 
default, in not providing them. Whatever they do they have backing from 
scientists, choosing economists or biologists according to the advice they 
wish to receive. Used in this way, science does not play its most useful 
role. 
The purpose of this article is to ask colleagues how far 
demography can make itself the authority in this matter. The lay public 
thinks that is our assignment, and yet what opinions we express are 
inconsistent and derive mostly from our participation in some other 
discipline. But to combine the findings of the several disciplines with 
new knowledge that we might discover requires modification and 
extension of our research agendas. 
The Issues Are Not New 
Even in the time of the classical economists the issues were by no means 
new. It takes little searching to find them repeated over and over again 
through the centuries.9•10•11 The Greek philosophers thought restraint 
desirable, in population as in other matters. But for Cicero ( 44 B.C.) as 
for other Roman writers who touched on the subject, there could never 
9 Stangeland, Charles Emil. 1967 [1904]. Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population. 
New York: AMS Press. 
10 United Nations. 1973. Detenninants and Consequences of Population Trends. 
Especially Chapter 3, Population Theory, pp. 33-63. 
11 Petersen, William. 1972. Readings in Population. New York: Macmillan. 
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be too many Romans--men who would conquer the lands on which they 
would maintain themselves, and women who would breed soldiers to 
conquer further lands. 
By the time of the Mercantilists sentiment was still emphatically 
populationist, but now for reasons economic rather than military.12•13 
Jean Bodin14 put the matter succinctly and equally without 
qualification: "There is no wealth but men [sic]y"; at the worst they could 
be put to work making cloth or other goods tractable for gold, and so 
add to the assets of the sovereign. (Still, even the Mercantilists spoke of 
the disorder and crime that they saw as resulting from denser population 
and the growth of cities.) 
For 150 years the Malthusian proposition that population tends 
to outrun its food supply was the basis of the discussion. "Malthus was 
the father of demography," say Caldwell and Caldwell, 15 and few fields 
have had so clear a parentage, based on so simple an idea. That 
proposition was expressed in its least qualified form in the first edition 
of Malthus's Essay. 16 (An easily accessible version comes with an 
12 Spengler, Joseph. 1942. French Predecessors of Malthus. Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press. 
13 Riley, James C. 1985. Population Thought in the Age of the Demographic 
Revolution. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press. 
14 Bodin, Jean. 1%2 [1576). The Six Books of a Commonwealth. Facsimile of 
English translation of Les six livres de la Republique. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
15 Caldwell, Jack and Pat Caldwell. 1986. Limiting Population Growth and the Ford 
Foundation Contribution, p. 4. London: Frances Pinter. 
16 Malthus, Thomas Robert. 1%6 [1798). First Essay on Population 1798 (A 
Reprint in Facsimile). London: Macmillan. 
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insightful introduction by Kenneth Boulding, 17 and a survey of 
Malthus's thought was presented by Joseph Spengler.18) 
The Malthusian thesis of the first Essay related the drive to 
reproduce and the need for sustenance. This was the form in which it 
was adopted by Darwin,19 but Malthus himself went off on a new path 
in the later editions of his Essay, which were wholly different books. 
The first Essay was a purely biological model; the later books were 
genuinely interdisciplinary. 
The way that Malthus made his later model biological-social was 
by introducing preventive checks, the idea that people could by their 
restraint avoid the hardship that seemed inevitable in the first Essay. 
Though regarded as a reactionary by many, he strongly favored 
education of the masses, when many of his countrymen thought that 
education was a threat to social stability. Malthus saw educated people 
as more able to exercise childbearing restraint, and dozens of studies in 
our own day show this--the education of women being especially 
effective. 
For Malthus the poverty threatened by too many people exercises 
an essential discipline. He seems to have regarded the discipline as 
good for its own sake, and one cannot be quite sure whether he thought 
that things had to be allowed to get worse before they could become 
better. (On this Marx was not at all ambivalent: Reform would only 
mitigate troubles and weaken the resentment that would bring the right 
solution; socialism would then solve all problems, including that of 
excess population.) In our own day Srinivasan is concerned about this 
matter: 
It is difficult to say whether an easing of demographic 
pressures will merely postpone the day of political 
17 Boulding, Kenneth E., Editor. 1967. Population: The First Essay [Malthus, 1798]. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
18 Spengler, Joseph J. 1945. "Malthus's Total Population Theory: A Restatement 
and Reappraisal." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 16(1):83-110. 
19 In his Autobiography Darwin says that on reading Malthus, "At last I had got an 
idea by which to work." 
reckoning or will provide an extended period during which 
institutions can respond positively.20 
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The harm that population growth can do to the general welfare 
is shown in an original way by Ricardo21 in his theory of rent, on a 
simple model in which with everything else the same additional people 
will necessitate the use of marginal lands, and the smaller returns that 
can be earned on these will under competition become the standard 
returns for all workers, with correspondingly larger amounts going to 
proprietors. Modern research shows this to be so in practice. "Ronald 
Lee's22 estimates for preindustrial England suggest that a 10 percent 
increase in population depressed real wages by 22 percent and raised 
rents by 19 percent" (quoted in Preston23). 
John Stuart Mill24 introduced the qualification that in secondary 
manufacturing, increasing returns to scale would be the rule. The 
diminished food per capita as population grew (successive mouths having 
the same need, and successive pairs of hands producing less) combined 
with the cheapening of secondary goods to set an optimum number for 
20 Srinivasan, T.N. 1987. "Population and Food." In Population Growth and 
Economic Development: Issues and Evidence, edited by D. Gale Johnson and Ronald 
D. Lee, p. 24. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, as quoted in Kelley, 
op. cit., p. 1,715. 
21 Ricardo, David. 1821. "The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation." In 
The Works and Co"espondence of David Ricardo, 1951-73, edited by Piero Sraffa. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
22 Lee, Ronald D. 1980. "A Historical Perspective on Economic Aspects of the 
Population Explosion: The Case of Pre-Industrial England." In Population and 
Economic Change in Developing Countries, edited by Richard E. Easterlin, pp. 517-56. 
Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
23 Preston, Samuel H. 1988. "Are the Economic Consequences of Population 
Growth a Sound Basis for Population Policy?" Population Bulletin of the United 
Nations, p. 3. 
2A Mill, John Stuart. 1%5 (1848]. Principles of Political Economy, with Some of 
Their Applications to Social Philosophy. Edited by J.M. Robson. In 2 volumes. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
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population, a concept that Sauvy25 makes central to analysis of the 
effect of population on welfare, notwithstanding its static character. But 
the advantage of size of market could be obtained by international trade, 
so there was no need for any country to push its population to the point 
where scarce foodstuffs brought down the general standard of living. In 
fact, small countries could well have an advantage, especially if they are 
culturally homogeneous, a point taken up by Kuznets.26 
''The proper framework of social institutions .. .is an indispensable 
prerequisite for economic growth .... The distinctive advantage of small 
nations lies in this determinant of economic growth--not in technology 
of production." Here and elsewhere we are in debt to Kuznets for 
stressing the institutional framework. 
The economist who railed most violently against Malthus was 
Karl Marx, in various places using arguments that he could not have 
meant seriously: "If Malthus is right the world was already 
overpopulated when there was one person on it."27 In population, as in 
other matters, the Peoples' Republic of China was for a time loyally 
Marxist. "Population is not a problem under socialism," declared the 
head of the Chinese delegation at Bucharest in 1974. But as an example 
of ideological flexibility, just a few years later in 1983: "We continue to 
lay special stress on population control...late marriage and one child per 
couple," said Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang.28 
is Sauvy, Alfred. 1963. Theorie generale de la population. In 2 volumes. Vol. 1, pp. 
50-4, and throughout. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
26 Kuznets, Simon. 1960. "Economic Growth of Small Nations." In Economic 
Consequences of the Size of Nations, edited by EA.G. Robinson, p. 32. London: 
Macmillan. 
v Quoted in Meek, R.L. 1953. Marx and Engels on Malthus, p. 59. London: 
Lawrence and Wishart. 
u Quoted in Demeny, Paul. 1985. "Bucharest, Mexico City, and Beyond." 
European Journal of Population 1(2/3). 
9 
Post-World War II Development 
In the 1960s the Harod-Domar29 model of the period before the War 
was applied to the less-developed countries (LDCs). It assumed 
unlimited labor and disregarded land, and so in effect made capital the 
source of wealth. Twentieth-century classics are Arthur Lewis30 and 
Gunnar Myrdal, 31 the former mainline economics, the latter more alert 
to social variables, both taking the classical view of the handicap 
constituted by a dense and growing population. Also somewhat old but 
still widely read is the work of Benjamin Higgins,32 which gives special 
attention to Indonesia. None of these books challenges the Malthus-
Ricardo-Mill view that population growth beyond some moderate density 
(already passed in most of the LDCs) is a clear drawback for individual 
welfare and for the economy as a whole. They all put population control 
in the forefront of the measures needed for development. As Frank 
Notestein expressed it for social scientists in general: 
The problems of economic development would be greatly 
simplified if the rate of population growth could be cut by 
a drastic reduction of fertility in the less developed 
countries. 33 
29 Domar, Evsey D. 1957. Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
30 Lewis, W. Arthur. 1955. The Theory of Economic Growth. London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
31 Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. 
New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 
32 Higgins, Benjamin H., and Jean D. Higgins. 1979. Economic Development of a 
Small Planet. New York: Norton. 
33 Notestein, Frank. 1975. "Population Policy and Development: A Summary 
View." In The Population Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives, Papers of the World 
Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974. In 2 volumes. Pp. 538-42. New York: 
United Nations. 
10 
Capital Shortage 
The book that took technical advance into account, and contributed 
some relatively solid numbers, was Coale and Hoover.34 After showing 
that India was likely to be able to produce the food it needed for several 
decades ahead, they focused on its limited capacity for capital 
accumulation. To oversimplify their argument, any increment of 
population would require tools and other capital at least equal to what 
its predecessors had used if it was to have the same livelihood, and this 
would require capital even before capital was used for the innovation in 
which development consists. "It is precisely in having more resources 
available for fruitful investment that we have found the principal 
economic advantage of reduced fertility." As empirical support, Coale35 
shows that although the cross-sectional correlation between per capita 
income increase and population increase is low, the correlation between 
per capita income increase and fertility, and between per capita income 
increase and percent under 15 years of age, is very high. 
The methodology introduced by Coale and Hoover was to 
calculate the pace of development in India and Mexico on various 
assumptions of the rate of population growth. They assumed that 
population growth has a negative effect on savings rates, and this 
assumption has had its critics. It is not easy to estimate how income will 
move with more people and how with fewer people in the context of the 
particular territory, and others would do it with different models, yet the 
methodological principle stands: Only by estimates for a particular 
territory can the question of too many people or not enough be 
answered. Any theory that shows there are always too many people, or 
never enough, disqualifies itself by proving too much. 
The Coale and Hoover argument held the field for most of 20 
years. It was explained in every population textbook and was the 
34 Coale, Ansley J., and Edgar M. Hoover. 1958. Population Growth and Economic 
Development in Low-Income Countries, p. 328. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
35 Coale, Ansley J. 1986. "Population Trends and Economic Development." In 
World Population and U.S. Policy: The Choices Ahead, edited by Jane Menken. New 
York: W.W. Norton for the American Assembly. 
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rationale for large population programs by the United States and other 
countries. Lloyd Reynolds36 is one economist of many who reflect it: 
"The lower the rate of labor force increase, the smaller the development 
effort needed to shift the economy's center of gravity." But now, says 
Preston: 
Capital/labor ratios, like natural resources, have left the 
center stage of the debate ... growth of capital stock has 
played a far smaller role in economic growth than had 
previously been believed.37 
What took the place of physical capital on center stage was human 
capital.38 
Indifference to conventional capital is not to be found in the 
administrative circles of Brasilia or Jakarta. The view prevailing in those 
places is closer to the Harod-Domar model than to the turn from 
physical capital to human capital. There is no question that over the long 
pull people are wealth, as the mercantilists said, and as Schultz added, 
educated people are very great wealth indeed, but in the shorter run 
there are foreign debts to repay, capital goods to buy, and people for 
whom jobs have to be created. 
Is the Birth Rate a Policy Variable? 
In much of the post-World War II period it was accepted by the more-
developed country (MDC) governments that population control was 
36 Reynolds, Lloyd. 1969. Economics. 3rd edition, p. 776. New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
37 Preston, op. cit., p. 2. 
38 Schultz, Theodore W. 1961. "Education and Economic Growth." In Social 
Forces Influencing American Education, edited by N.B. Henry. Chicago, Illinois: 
National Society for the Study of Education. Also Schultz, T.W., Editor. 1962. 
"Investment in Human Beings." Journal of Political Economy. Supplement 70(5), Part 
II. 
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indispensable, and the main discussion was whether birth control 
programs could actually have an effect in the desired lowering of the 
birth rate. Writers followed Notestein39 in subscribing to a 
demographic transition, in which the birth rate inevitably falls after 
mortality has fallen and development has reached a certain stage. 
Perlman40 would categorize this as the Iron Law of Wages/neo-
Malthusian approach: "Economic progress leads to demographic 
response (not the other way around)." He contrasts this with 
Kuznets's41 emphasis on the advantages of population growth to 
economic development. 
Notestein's demographic transition was taken so seriously by 
some, especially in the LDCs, that they asserted that there was little 
need for sponsored programs of birth control, whose contraceptive 
instruments would come to be used only after development was well 
under way and not before. Needed, therefore, was large-scale capital aid 
rather than population programs. As Indira Gandhi said, "Development 
is the best contraceptive," and "Are not poverty and need the greatest 
polluters?",42 phrases that have been rallying cries ever since. 
Work investigating the condition of population in the world and 
just how much difference birth control programs make is due to 
Berelson,43 of which an account is given in Ross and Mauldin.44 A 
3'J Notestein, Frank. 1945. "Population: The Long View." In Food for the World, 
edited by T.W. Schultz. Norman Wait Harris Memorial Fund Lectures. 
40 Perlman, Mark. 1981. "Population and Economic Change in Developing 
Countries: A Review Article." Journal of Economic Literature 19:74-82 (March). 
41 Kuznets, Simon. 1960. "Population Change and Aggregate Output." 
Demographic and Economic Change in Developing Countries, pp. 324-40. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
42 Quoted in United Nations. 1972. Environment Stockholm, p. 18. Geneva: 
United Nations. 
43 Berelson, Bernard. 1975. The Great Debate on Population Policy: An Instnlctive 
Entertainment. New York: Population Council. 
44 Ross, John A., and W. Parker Mauldin. 1988. Berelson on Population. New 
York: Springer Verlag. 
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careful case study is provided by Freedman, Takeshita, et al.45 on the 
decline of fertility in Taiwan. Briefly interpreted, all these studies 
showed that if there is no economic or cultural incentive to population 
control, then sponsored programs providing contraceptives will do little 
(see also Sauvy46); if there is full sophistication, programs are obviously 
unnecessary. Many countries and groups within countries now fall 
between these two conditions, and in them the fall of the birth rate is 
indeed speeded by the availability of information and the instruments of 
contraception. Hermalin,47 reviewing eight studies, finds strong effects 
of programs in all. Siew-Ean-Khoo48 finds 48 percent of the fall in 
fertility attributable to program effects in Hong Kong, 64 percent in 
Malaysia. 
Especially relevant here is the coherence of the traditional family, 
in particular its provision of old-age security. Few would disagree with 
Leibenstein49 in attributing the high fertility of traditional societies to 
the need of parents to secure their old age. Owning children is like any 
other kind of family saving, perhaps better than owning a bank account 
or a house. (Much less often mentioned is the converse--that in 
industrial societies, which have government and commercial pension 
systems, the birth rate is low because children are not needed for old-
age security.) 
45 Freedman, R., J. Takeshita, et al. 1969. Family Planning in Taiwan: An 
Experiment in Social Change. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
46 Sauvy, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 225. 
47 Hermalin, Albert I. 1982. "Issues in the Comparative Analysis of Techniques for 
Evaluating Family Planning Programs." In Evaluation of the Impact of Family Planning 
Programmes on Fertility: Sources of Variance, pp. 29-40. New York: United Nations. 
48 Siew-Ean-Khoo. 1978. Effects of Program Contraception on Fertility: A 
Comparison of Three Asian Countries. Paper 54. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West 
Population Institute. 
49 Leibenstein, Harvey. 1957. Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons. 
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Notestein50 some time ago referred to meaningless debate 
between advocates of economic development, social change, and family 
planning: "All three are required, and no one is a substitute for 
another." This theme also runs through the writings of Philip Hauser51 
and Donald Bogue.52 
Bucharest and Mexico City 
The view that population control is important for development, on which 
most MDC demographers at the time agreed, encountered opposition 
through the 1970s in many of the LDCs. The World Population Plan of 
Action of 1971, dominated by the LDCs, had started in this contrary 
vein: "Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. 
Mankind's future can be made indefinitely bright."53 The opposition 
between the MDCs (the United States in particular) and the LDCs came 
to a head in 1974 in Bucharest.54 It was mostly through the influence 
of the LDCs that the final act of the Conference included the statement 
that "the basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above 
all, socioeconomic transformation."55 
Much has happened since the Bucharest Conference. Some of 
the MDCs started to ask whether family planning was important for 
economic growth, whether a larger population, either in particular 
countries or in the world as a whole, would be such a severe handicap 
to development. This fitted with a strong pro-birth, antiabortion 
50 Notestein, 1975, op. cit. 
51 Hauser, Philip M., Editor. 1%3. The Population Dilemma. New York: The 
American Assembly. 
52 Bogue, Donald J., Editor. 1%7. Sociological Contributions to Family Planning 
Research. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
53 Demeny, op. cit., p. 132. 
S4 Ibid. 
ss World Population Plan of Action, Bucharest, August 1974, paragraph A.I. 
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movement in U.S. politics, especially in the years since 1980. By the 
time of the Mexico City Conference in 1984,56 the protagonists had 
changed sides from 1974: The LDCs, beginning to experience some of 
the seemingly intractable problems of development, insisted on the 
importance of population aid programs, while the United States 
expressed uncertainty on the need for them, tending to stress the 
immorality of abortion and speaking against coercion and in favor of the 
right of couples to have as many children or as few as they wanted. 
The American Assembly sums up the reversal in the United 
States in its current report: 
Since 1981, the United States has retreated from the 
strong leadership role on world population it exercised in 
the two previous decades. The ideological debate has 
destroyed a bipartisan consensus ... [yet] no administration 
can be regarded as serious about the environment unless 
it is serious about global population growth.57 
The Importance of People 
Julian Simon58 provides the most unqualified populationist argument 
since Jean Bodin:59 Countries can benefit from indefinite numbers of 
people; the more people, the more production. 
Underlying all this in its contemporary expression is a profound 
if implicit faith in human ingenuity. Technology spurred by the free 
market can liberate production from the land, find substitute materials, 
56 Demeny, op. cit. 
57 Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, Editor. 1991. Preserving the Global Environment: 
The Challenge of Shared Leadership, p. 327. New York: W.W. Norton. 
58 Simon, Julian L. 1982. "A Scheme to Promote World Economic Development 
with Migration." In Research in Population Economics, edited by J.L. Simon and P.H. 
Lindert, Volume 4. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAi Press. 
~ Bodin, op. cit. 
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and overcome damage to the ecological base. For most neoclassical 
economists, technology is exogenous, but Julian Simon thinks it is driven 
by population; if that were so the inhabitants of squatter colonies in 
Mexico City or hungry cattle herders in the Sahel would be very creative. 
Especially if the economy shifts towards tertiary industries that require 
little of either land or capital, then with labor as the sole productive 
agent both population and the economy can expand indefinitely. Writers 
(e.g., Herman et al.ro) speak of dematerialization of the economy; both 
the inputs and the outputs of production diminish in weight and volume. 
And Malthus's bugbear of food limits is postponed to far in the future 
in the otherwise ecologically oriented F AO study of carrying capacity 
(Higgins et al.61). Avery62 is even more optimistic, citing triticale and 
other discoveries. 
For Kuznets63 population growth brings new labor force into 
cities in early industrialization and also increases demand. He shows the 
association of economic growth with population growth and its urban 
concentration, which in the early days provided both the masses of 
workers and the mass market for their product. He comments64 on the 
"° Herman, Robert, Siamak A. Ardekani, and Jesse H. Ausubel. 1989. 
"Dematerialization." In Technology and Environment, edited by Jesse H. Ausubel and 
Hedy E. Sladovich. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
61 Higgins, G.M., et al. 1982. Potential Population Supporting Capacities of Lands 
in the Developing World. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
62 Avery, Dennis. 1985. "U.S. Farm Dilemma: The Global Bad News is Wrong." 
Science 230:408-12. 
63 Kuznets, Simon. 1966. Modem Economic Growth, Rate, Strncture and Spread. 
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Also Kuznets, Simon. 1967. 
"Population and Economic Growth." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 
111(3):170-93. 
64 Kuznets, Simon. 1975. "Population Trends and Modern Economic Growth--
Notes Towards a Historical Perspective." In The Population Debate: Dimensions and 
Perspectives, Papers of the World Population Conference, Bucharest, 1974. In 2 
volumes. Pp. 425-33. New York: United Nations. 
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desirability of reducing fertility to accord with contemporary low 
mortality, but expresses no fear of population increase. 
Ambivalence in modern economics is shown by two quotations 
(from J. R. Hicks65) within a few pages of each other: "Overpopulation 
through shortage of land is one of the great causes of the poverty there 
is in the world." Hicks speaks of overpopulation as a "terrible 
possibility." On the other hand: "It is not impossible that the slowing-up 
of population increase may have been one of the things responsible for 
the exceptional unemployment which occurred during the 1930s." The 
last assertion--that slowing population causes unemployment as discussed 
below--would hardly appeal to the intuition of third-world administrators, 
and yet the arguments of Keynes,66 Hansen,67 and Kuznets68 all 
support it. 
Institutions for Orderly Exploitation of Resources 
Suitable institutions for the use of natural resources became a 
preoccupation in the late 1960s. Those that are accessible to all are 
cared for by none, as Garrett Hardin69 told us in a simple and 
influential article. His expression "tragedy of the commons" has become 
a part of the language, used, for example, by Ronald Lee 70 in the title 
M Hicks, J.R. 1971. The Social Framework. 4th edition, pp. 56, 59. Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press. 
66 Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money. London: Macmillan. 
67 Hansen, Alvin. 1938. "Economic Progress and Declining Population." 
Presidential Address to the American Economic Association. 
68 Kuznets, Simon. 1979. Growth, Population and Income Distribution: Selected 
Essays. New York: Norton and Co. 
(J} Hardin, Garrett. 1968. 'The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 1162:1,243-8. 
70 Lee, Ronald D. 1989. "The Second Tragedy of the Commons." Unpublished 
manuscript. Graduate Group in Demography, University of California at Berkeley. 
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of a recent article that finds in protection of the environment an 
argument for limiting population stronger than those of development 
economics. 
The essence of a commons is that the one who exploits it secures 
the benefit, while at least some of the cost is external, i.e., it falls on 
others. Population increase hastens the destruction of any commons--the 
grazing field of a village, or a nation's forests, or the ocean fisheries. If 
crowding brings into people's vision the greater effectiveness of private 
ownership of land and they set up a system of land tenure, thus 
internalizing the externality, then their crowding will have brought major 
benefit. Individual tenure will provide incentives to economizing and to 
innovative methods of production.71 If all commons could be 
appropriated and all externalities internalized, including those costs on 
later generations, most of the problems mentioned in this survey would 
disappear. 
The positive effects of population on institutions is represented 
in the current literature by Ester Boserup,72 in a tradition that goes 
back to Durkheim and ultimately to Adam Smith. Durkheim devoted the 
first of his major works 73 to the way that people protect themselves 
against the pressure of population by seeking a niche, i.e., a specialized 
function in which they will be sheltered from the storms of competition. 
The need to set up suitable international institutions rather than 
leave them to emerge spontaneously from population growth or other 
natural cause has recently been set forth by William Clark. 74 
71 National Academy of Sciences. 1986. Population and Development. Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press. 
72 Boserup, Ester. 1981. Population and Technological Change: A Study of Long 
Terms. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Also Boserup, Ester. 1987. 
"Population and Technology in Pre-Industrial Europe." Population and Development 
Review 13(4):691-701. 
13 Durkheim, Emile. 1978 [1893]. De la division du travail social [On the Social 
Division of Labor). 10th edition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
74 Clark, William C. 1989. "The Politics of Planetary Management." Environment 
31. 
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Limiting Factors: The Model Builders 
The classical economic tradition of population study, concerned with the 
limits to land and hence to food supplies, sensing the impossibility of 
indefinite exponential increase, has now passed to scholars of other 
disciplines. An early, widely read exposition by D. H. and D. L. 
Meadows was sponsored by the Club of Rome.75 It was followed by 
Mesavoric and Pestel76 and other writers. A similar spirit animated a 
later investigation led by Bamey.77 International organizations, 
especially the ILO, came into this, and many models were built for, or 
in any case applied to, particular countries; among these the BACHUE 
models are the most often cited. On the other side, Kahn and Wiener78 
attracted attention with a model in which population was no great 
obstacle to economic growth. 
The acknowledged antecedent of the Club of Rome model-
building was Jay W. Forrester.79 Population is central for Forrester. 
He has feedback loops in which population is controlled respectively by 
crowding, pollution, food supply, and natural resources. Any one of 
these can bring the exponential population growth to a halt, and can 
indeed cause sudden and tragic collapse of population (Chapters 2 and 
4). ''The Malthusian thesis has been true and is at work at all times" (p. 
27). 
Forrester explains the suddenness of reaching "crisis level" by the 
property of an exponential, for instance one that doubles every 50 years 
75 Meadows, D.H., D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W.W. Behrens III. 1972. 17ie 
Limits to Growth. New York: Universe Books. 
76 Mesavoric, M., and E. Pestel. 1974. Mankind at the Turning Point. New York: 
E.P. Dutton. 
77 Barney, G.O. 1980. Global 2000: The Report to the President, Entering the 21st 
Century. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
78 Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. 1967. The Year 2000: A Framework for 
Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years. New York: Macmillan. 
79 Forrester, Jay W. 1971. World Dynamics. Cambridge, England: Wright-Allen 
Press. 
20 
(p. 3). "Even though nothing has changed in the underlying law which 
until then has governed growth ... within one lifetime, dormant forces 
within the world system can exert themselves and take control" (p. 5); 
"food ... has been potentially sufficient throughout all of history," yet 
suddenly we have a "starvation crisis" (p. 7). Although conditions do not 
now appear exceptionally bright, in comparison with both past and 
future "we may now be living in a 'golden age'" (p. 11 ): 
There may be no realistic hope of the present 
underdeveloped countries reaching the standard of living 
demonstrated by the present industrialized nations .... With 
four times as many people ... their rising ... could mean an 
increase of 10 times in the natural resource and pollution 
load on the world environment. (p. 12) 
To go one step further back, the originator of such simulation was 
Guy Orcutt,80 who did his first work when computers had barely become 
available. Perhaps we have now come to the end of an era; we know 
what such models can do, which is not trifling, but on the other hand we 
know, from seeing the diverse results that they produce, how susceptible 
they are to the assumptions on which they are constructed. Says 
McNicoll,81 "The age of dinosaurs among population-development 
models may be coming to an end." Arthur and McNicoll82 and 
BO Orcutt, G.H., M. Greenberger, J. Korbel, and A.M. Rivlin. 1961. Microanalysis 
of Socioeconomic Systems: A Simulation Study. New York: Harper and Row. 
81 McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1981. "Notes on Population Development Modelling and 
Policy Formation." In Population and Development Modelling, Proceedings of the 
UN/UNFPA Expert Group Meeting, Geneva, 24-28 September 1979, pp. 93-6. New 
York: United Nations. 
82 Arthur, Brian W., and Geoffrey McNicoll. 1975. "Large Scale Simulation Models 
in Population and Development: What Use to Planners." Population and Development 
Review 1:251-65. 
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McNicoll83 have useful reviews of such models. Warren Sanderson84 
discusses seven economic-demographic models in some detail. 
Although all such work is subject to many questions, long after its 
techniques and specific results are forgotten the Club of Rome will be 
remembered for calling public attention to neglected aspects of 
economic growth and for being in the vanguard of what is now a 
worldwide ecological movement. It certainly deserves a better 
evaluation than Julian Simon's: 
The Limits to Growth simulation .. .is not worth detailed 
discussion or criticism .... [It is] public relations hype ... [and 
the Club of Rome] scared many people with these lies.85 
Carrying Capacity 
A more restrained analysis is made by Revelle.86 He takes up the 
population carrying capacity of the world as a whole, starting with the 
energy of sunlight, going through its transformation into primary (cereal) 
food energy, up to its availability for support of populations. His energy 
conversion process is modeled on that of an Iowa farmer, and he leaves 
open the question of how the gap between the present 5 billion world 
population and the 30 billion physical potential can be covered. 
The notion of carrying capacity is congenial to natural scientists 
and an irritation to social scientists. To biologists or agriculturalists used 
to studying the capacity of pasture lands to maintain livestock, it seems 
83 McNicoll, 1984, op. cit. 
84 Sanderson, Warren. 1980. Economic-Demographic Simulation Models: A Review 
of Their Usefulness for Policy Analysis. RR-80-14. Laxenburg, Austria: International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
&5 Simon, Julian L. 1981. The Ultimate Resource, p. 286. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
86 Revelle, Roger. 1975. Will the Ecnth's Land and Water Resources be Sufficient 
for Future Populations? Volume 2, pp. 3-14. Bucharest: United Nations. 
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natural to take it as Malthus did that beyond a certain population in a 
given area growth will bring misery. Those who sponsor this view tend 
to downplay trade, but even if trade is admitted there must be a certain 
carrying capacity for the world as a whole, say those who write along this 
line. Thus a background paper by Kirchner to the 1984 World 
Development Report begins: 
The carrying capacity of a particular region is the 
maximum population of a given species that can be 
supported indefinitely, allowing for seasonal and random 
changes, without any degradation of the natural resource 
base that would diminish this maximum population in the 
future. The concept of carrying capacity is familiar to 
biologists and wildlife managers .... With modifications, it is 
also an important measure of the ability of regions to 
support human populations.87 
The economic viewpoint stands in contrast to this, and one 
branch of the debate concerns food resources and the effects of MDC 
extravagance in converting the largest part of its grain calories into meat. 
D. Gale Johnson88 makes the point that curbing this extravagance 
would be a mistaken policy: If the industrial countries had held down 
their indirect grain consumption, there would have been less produced, 
reserve stocks would have been smaller, and the institutions required to 
handle grain exports would not have taken their present shape. In a 
sense American extravagance in meat consumption results, through the 
market, in a world reserve against famine. 
The argument is unassailable on its terms, but the terms change 
once the environment is brought in. The loss of soil and of water, the 
poisoning of streams, etc., are a different and more difficult matter. 
lf1 World Bank. 1984. World Development Report 1984. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
88 Johnson, D. Gale. 1974. World Food Problems and Prospects. Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute. 
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Resources 
Barnett and Morse89 provide an ambitious treatment that shows little 
need for husbanding resources. For them, the uniformity of energy and 
matter are such that anything can be turned into nearly anything else, 
and they support their view with extensive data. The persistent fall in 
real (i.e., relative) prices of nearly all raw materials is before the eyes 
of all of us. It is very much evident to the many LDCs that export raw 
materials. Oil is the big exception, and even for oil the shortage is by no 
means imminent. 
Among the economists who early on took the exhaustion of 
resources seriously and stressed the implications for intergenerational 
equity was Stanley Jevons,90 with his worry about whether England 
could maintain its large population (then about 25 million, much of it 
employed in industry) when it ran out of the coal needed by industry. 
Since that particular concern turned out to be misplaced, he gets little 
credit. Repetto91 and others demonstrate the robustness of supply of 
most minerals. Thus there seem to be good reasons why the need to 
control population is no longer argued from the limits of mineral 
resources, notwithstanding that they are called "nonrenewable." But 
certain other resources, especially water and soil, forests, and fisheries, 
come under increasing pressure, and contrary to what the words imply, 
these "renewable" resources are the ones of which we are more likely to 
run short. Though the world's forests are in principle renewable, in fact 
IP Barnett, Harold, and C. Morse. 1%3. Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of 
Natural Resource Availability. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
90 Jevons, William Stanley. 1909. The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the 
Progress of the Nations and the Probable Exhaustion of Our Coal-Mines. London: 
Macmillan. 
91 Repetto, Robert. 1986. World Enough and Time: Successful Strategies for 
Resource Management. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
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they are being destroyed. 92 A quick history of economic thought on the 
subject is provided by Dasgupta and Heal: 
To nineteenth-century man, it would therefore have 
seemed unthinkable that one could explain the dynamics 
of an economy, or analyze the processes of production and 
exchange, without giving special attention to the role of 
natural resources. 
The economic theorists of the twentieth century 
have, however, proceeded on the basis of just such an 
omission, at least until recently: in the works that have 
exercised a dominant influence on the evolution of 
economic theory in the last half century--Hicks's Value and 
Capital, Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis 
and the developments of the Arrow-Debreu model--there 
are few explicit references to natural resources. 
The wheel has now turned full circle: in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, no general text on 
economics will be complete without a reference to 
resource depletion.93 
This forecast has not so far been validated. 
Damage Resulting from Growth 
A clear example of the non-sustainability of short-run solutions is the use 
of chemical pesticides, which often are more effective on the pest's 
predators than on the pest itself, and so result in increasing the pest they 
aim to control. Examples abound, first pointed out by American 
92 Repetto, Robert. 1988. Forest for the Trees? Government Policies and the Misuse 
of Forest Resources. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute. 
93 Dasgupta, P.S., and G.M. Heal. 1979. Economic Theory and Exhaustible 
Resources. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
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authors, among whom the pioneer was Rachel Carson;94 Perring and 
Mellanby95 are among her many successors. The relatively short time 
interval between the alarm raised by writers and biologists and the 
banning of pesticides most dangerous to humans and least useful in 
controlling pests gives some hope for democratic political systems--they 
are responsive to the findings of scientists when these speak with one 
voice. 
Ecologists stress the growth of population as not the least of the 
forces that drive the use of pesticides, such as synthetic fertilizers and 
weed-killers. Having built up population on the food output that these 
chemical means permit, we cannot entirely stop their use, but only try 
to moderate their worst effects. Biologists are now learning how they 
may be effectively used in combination with biological controls. 
In a different way biologists explain the extinction of species as 
a result of human population growth. Growth causes more land to be 
cultivated, more cultivated land to be taken over by urban 
municipalities, and more trees to be cut down and forest species 
displaced. Animal and plant species come and go in the normal course 
of evolution, but never has the disappearance of species been as rapid 
as today. Writers in Elliott% emphasize the disappearances caused by 
human activities and the way that such activities simplify ecological 
systems and make the web of life less stable. Detail is provided in 
Ehrlich and Ehrlich.97 Kenneth Arrow98•99 has a piece of 
94 Carson, Rachel. 1987 [1%2]. Silent Spring. 25th anniversary edition. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin. 
95 Perring, F.H., and K. Mellanby, Editors. 1978. Ecological Effects of Pesticides. 
London: Academic Press. 
96 Elliott, D.K., Editor. 1986. Dynamics of Extinction. New York: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
97 Ehrlich, Paul R., and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1983. Extinction: The Causes and 
Consequences of the Disappearance of Species. New York: Ballantine. 
98 Arrow, Kenneth J. 1984. Individual Choice under Certainty and Uncertainty. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
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mathematics that clarifies irreversible decisions, of which development 
actions that cause species to become extinct are the prime example. The 
conclusion is that ignorance of whether the species in question could be 
of use at some later time should lead to less development than would be 
optimum without this consideration. Though in principle the actors in 
the market could allow for this, one doubts that in practice they give it 
much attention. 
The reason is that commercial considerations push for short-term 
gains. In Herman Daly's example, 
If a whaler, for example, can make a profit of 15 percent 
per year by exterminating whales over 10 years and then 
investing the proceeds in another activity, what economic 
incentive is there to make a profit of only 10 per cent per 
year by harvesting the whales sustainably?100 
And if the whaler has been financed at 12 percent he can only choose 
between exterminating the whales and bankruptcy. If this market 
unconcern for the future applies where the use of the spe-cies is already 
well known, how much more does it apply in Arrow's case where the 
future use is contingent. 
Can Technology Reconcile Economy and Ecology and 
Also Provide for Economic Growth? 
One key to reconciling the economic and the ecological approach is 
technology, on which there is a large literature. Some write the phrase 
"transfer of technology" as equivalent to "economic development." A 
9') Arrow, Kenneth J., and A.C. Fisher. 1974. "Environmental Preservation, 
Uncertainty and Irreversibility." Quarterly Journal of Economics 88. 
100 Goodland, Robert, and Herman Daly. 1990. "The Missing Tools." In Planet 
Under Stress, edited by Constance Mungall and Digby J. McLaren, p. 274. Toronto: 
Oxford University Press. 
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summary is given in Johnston and Sasson,101 whose chapter on 
Biotechnologies and Food Systems is especially relevant to population; 
changing from chemical controls to genetics could solve many problems. 
Finding or making food plant species that thrive on seawater would 
bring North African and other coastal arid lands back into production. 
This, like other standard references, 102 mostly covers the positive side 
of technology; the disadvantages and side effects are more difficult to 
discover. Lester Brown103 shows that food is less plentiful than has 
been thought, and that shifts to non-animal shortenings, margarine, soya-
based meat substitutes, non-dairy whipped toppings, and coffee whiteners 
in effect increase carrying capacity in the F AO sense. It was 
Schumacher104 and Barry Commoner105 who gave the alarm on the 
negative aspects. For them, the present direction of technology may well 
solve every problem, but in doing so it creates new problems that can be 
even more difficult; we therefore need to reverse direction and to seek 
softer and simpler technologies. 
Clearly technology is the cause of many present problems, and it 
is also the best hope for solving them. Population also is the cause of 
problems, and its control provides the means of mitigating them. How 
then can responsibility for present difficulties be allocated; how much is 
due to population and how much to technology? When two factors 
operate for good or for bad, sharing the credit or the blame presents a 
difficult problem of imputation. 
101 Johnson, A., and A. Sasson. 1986. New Technologies and Development. Paris: 
UNESCO. 
102 Encyclopedia of Science and Technology (1982), of which the most recent annual 
update is the Yearbook of Science and Technology (1989). 
103 Brown, Lester R. 1975. "World Population and Food Supplies: Looking Ahead." 
In Papers Prepared for the Bucharest Conference, Volume 2, pp. 15-24. New York: 
United Nations. 
104 Schumacher, E.M. 1973. Small is Beautiful. London: Blond and Briggs. 
1~ Commoner, Barry H. 1971. The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
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Commoner as well as Ehrlich and Ehrlich106 express the 
imputation of environmental damage to technology and to population 
with the formula E =PIT, where E is the environment, P the population, 
I average income, and T some measure of the harshness of the 
technology used. One school will hold constant technology and income, 
and blame population for all problems; another will hold constant 
population and allocate the blame to technology or to income. It is 
fairer to take it that these three factors of "production" are all operative; 
if they work independently the simple decomposition on readily available 
data gives the answer. Ehrlich and Commoner disagree on the 
interpretation of the numbers that come out in this way, but more 
important, the whole decomposition is rejected by those who see the 
factors as interrelated. In particular, high incomes are mostly the result 
of advanced technologies. And it is argued by the National Academy of 
Sciences, 107 Kuznets, Boserup, Preston, and others cited earlier that 
dense population can itself improve institutions and technology and so 
raise income. Those who find such relationships oversophisticated and 
the evidence for them inconclusive will come back to the direct and 
simple decomposition of Ehrlich and Commoner. 
Development Literature for Particular Countries and Areas 
The richest part of the development literature is found in the 
monographs on specific areas, of which there are hundreds--for instance 
Shaw108 and Kelley et al., 109 both dealing with the Middle East. 
Mauritius is an instructive case because it is a small territory, which up 
106 Ehrlich, Paul R., and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1990. The Population F.xplosion. New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
107 National Academy of Sciences, 1986, op. cit. 
108 Shaw, R. Paul. 1983. Mobilizing Human Resources in the Arab World. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
1® Kelley, A.C., et al. 1982. Population and Development in Rural Egypt. Duke 
Press Policy Studies. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 
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until the 1960s was miserably poor, almost wholly dependent on exports 
of sugar to a buyer's market, and with a rapidly increasing population. 
Since that time its economy has diversified, its exports have greatly 
increased, and its population growth has been checked. Wolfgang Lutz 
of llASA is undertaking a major study to find out how the turnaround 
was accomplished. 
The World Bank is a particularly valuable source of data, not 
only in its annual World Development Reports but in the series of country 
monographs, usually written by distinguished scholars on the basis of 
actual examination. These are issued by reputable publishers, including 
Johns Hopkins and Oxford, and are an unsubstitutable contribution to 
the development literature. 
It cannot be stressed too often that most of the general theory 
proves too much, showing either that more people are always an 
advantage for welfare or that they are never an advantage, so study of 
particular areas is the right way to go. Of course theory is needed. The 
Coale and Hoover work uses theory to forecast the future of India and 
Mexico on various scenarios supposing more and less population. If 
such long-term forecasting is impossible, then we had better admit that 
we can never know whether population increase is advantageous or not. 
Unbalanced Underdevelopment 
Case studies of particular areas show innumerable instances of 
disequilibrium--in food, in population, and in rising wages that price 
countries out of manufactures. The most obvious source is population 
growth; Frank and McNicoll110 study Kenyan rural institutions in the 
face of averages of five or more children per woman surviving to 
adulthood. They show that the rural inheritance system cannot last 
many generations with the division of holdings that is occurring. 
The standard general literature discusses policies that will keep 
GNP rising uniformly year after year, as far as possible in a semi-
automatic process. Opposed to this history-free approach are 
11
° Frank, Odile, and Geoffrey McNicoll. 1987. "An Interpretation of Fertility and 
Population Policy in Kenya." Population and Development Review 13:209-43. 
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Hirschman, 111 Rosenstein-Rodan, 112 and others who see imbalances 
everywhere and propose that advantage be taken of them, or even that 
they be deliberately created. 
For Leibenstein113 population is endogenous, determined within 
the model. A great shock is necessary to get development moving 
(technical progress, infusion of capital), and when it does get going 
population growth will fall. Until it gets going, rational parents thinking 
of their old age give little attention to population programs that would 
persuade them to limit their families. 
Various equilibria of population and its surroundings existed in 
past times. Before he had efficient stone tools man was in equilibrium 
with other primates who shared the limited food supplies; after 
agriculture and urbanization he painfully came into equilibrium with 
bacteria, as McNei1114 shows. At each point a preceding balance was 
disturbed by some (in itself desirable) innovation. Currently it is the 
initial steps, or partial development, that unbalance societies and 
urgently demand further steps in development. Partial development 
includes mass education, urbanization, some very rich people, and many 
as poor as ever, with population still growing and the poor watching with 
envy the rich in their own country and abroad. As Sauvy115 says, "Le 
propre du desequilibre est de creer le mouvement." There is no 
question that movement is occurring, but are the conditions such that it 
is movement toward welfare or movement toward disaster? 
m Hirschman, Albert 0. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
112 Rosenstein-Rodan, P.N. 1964. Capital Fonnation and Economic Development. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
113 Leibenstein, op. cit. 
114 McNeil, William H. 1976. Plagues and Peoples. Garden City, New York: 
Anchor Press. 
115 Sauvy, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 4. 
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Unemployment and Rapid Population Growth 
Much of the concern of the LDCs has revolved around employment, 
with increase of GNP often thought of as a means to this rather than an 
end in itself. For whatever reason, they do not accept the explanation 
of unemployment (for instance in Beckerman's116 book) as due simply 
to rigidities and remediable by removing those rigidities. Rather they 
incurred huge debts in the 1970s and 1980s to purchase capital intended 
to employ their urban citizens, who are now coming out of schools and 
colleges in the thousands. With the closing off of further loans, at least 
from the private banks of the United States and Germany, they turned 
to inflationary financing of employment. Thus population growth and 
the need to employ urban youth if civil order is to be maintained has 
been one of the incentives to indebtedness and inflation. Of course 
these maladies have other causes as well, among which are such 
mistaken policies as farm and food subsidies.117 Somewhat extended 
chains of reasoning are required to justify Lester Brown's118 assertion 
of the· connections between population growth and various social and 
economic problems, connections more roundabout than those that 
appear in conventional economics. My ecumenical view is that any 
chain of causation that is not self-contradictory probably exists 
somewhere, and these are all operating together, but most are minor 
effects that are swamped by larger effects; the problem is to find which 
are the minor and which the major. It is not easy to force data to speak 
unambiguously and pick out for us the practically important chains of 
causation. 
In the creation of the disequilibrium represented by the 
employment problem, education has a part to play. Increasing 
population, an increasing fraction of which has college training and 
116 Beckerman, Wilfred, Editor. 1986. Wage Rigidity and Unemployment. London: 
Duckworth. 
117 As Robert Dorfman points out to me in personal correspondence. 
118 Brown, Lester R. 1976. Twenty-Two Dimensions of the Population Problem. 
Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute. 
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corresponding expectations as described by Dore, 119 is a chief worry 
of many regimes in the LDCs. Up to the time of World War II cities 
were small, population growth was kept down by high mortality, 
education was for the few, and the people lived out their lives doing 
manual work in the countryside. They came to the city only when jobs 
were created by investment of capital, as in Arthur Lewis's famous 
interpretation of Adam Smith.120 That description does not well cover 
the partial development to be seen in the LDCs today; the flow to the 
cities comes long before the jobs to employ it exist. 
Sustainable Development 
In recent years the continuing debate seems to have become centered 
on the word "sustainable." Can population and income both continue 
growing forever? The question is of course the old Malthusian one, with 
the modification that today's economy is very different from the one 
Malthus knew. The answer for population still has to be no; for the 
economy it may now be yes, depending on the form that growth takes. 
Gunnar Myrdal saw limits to what the environment can stand: 
Population increase is the key factor in the environmental 
problem. Natural resources have to be considered in 
relation to the population which is to be provided for.121 
And recently Ronald Lee, accepting the plentiful evidence that 
population growth does not damage the economy, also located the 
population problem in the harm done to the environment: 
119 Dore, Ronald P. 1976. The Diploma Disease: Education, Qualification and 
Development. London: Allen and Unwin. 
120 Lewis, W. Arthur. 1954. "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labor." Manchester School 22:139-91 (May). 
121 Myrdal, Gunnar. 1972. Against the Stream, p. 211. New York: Vintage Books. 
Of course many potential consequences of population 
growth would not be caught in the net of economic 
statistics, which mainly reflect the goods and services 
passing through markets. The most serious consequences 
of population growth may well be those afflicting 
nonmarket resources, particularly environmental resources 
and amenities.122 
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An increasing minority of economists in good standing are 
preoccupied with environmental matters and have produced important 
work on some of the hidden costs of growth. One of the earliest and 
most emphatic was E. J. Mishan.123 Writing on this aspect are 
Herman Daly124 and Bartelmus, 125 along with a Mexican 
anthropologist, Arizpe.126 Valuable contributions are collected in 
Dorfman and Dorfman.127 After the World Bank encountered a storm 
of criticism on certain of its projects, which included a special issue of 
the British journal Ecology,128 it made substantial changes in its aid 
policies. 
122 Lee, 1989, op. cit. 
123 Mishan, EJ. 1969. Growth: The Price We Pay. London: Staples Press. 
124 Daly, Herman E., and John Cobb. 1989. For the Common Good: Redirecting 
the Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 
125 Bartelmus, Peter. 1986. Environment and Development. Boston, Massachusetts: 
Allen and Unwin. 
126 Arizpe, Lourdes. 1989. On the Cultural and Social Sustainability of Economic 
Development Models. Paper presented at 25th Anniversary Symposium "The Next 
Decade: Interdependence in a Multipolar and Two-Track World Economy." Paris: 
OECD Development Centre. 
m Dorfman, Robert, and Nancy S. Dorfman. 1977. Economics of the Environment: 
Selected Readings. New York: Norton. 
128 Ecology. 1986. Special Issue on Environment. 
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Average income can increase indefinitely provided the shift to 
services that we see prominently today continues rapidly enough. No 
environmental limits prevent more medical services per capita, more 
education per capita, more and better restaurants, or more and better 
opera. In fact this is the way a series of writers, as far back as Colin 
Clark and Fouristie, saw that the economy would inevitably move from 
primary to secondary to tertiary. Primary is based essentially on land, 
and the population limit is sharp; secondary is more flexible, but it still 
requires materials and energy; tertiary is the most flexible of all, 
requiring little outside of skill and effort. 
The trouble for sustainable growth is that the economy does not 
move that way fast enough. As they become richer people do want more 
services, but they also want more houses, more automobiles, and more 
air travel. Taking all increments to their incomes in the form of services 
would not suit the present developed countries, and it would certainly 
not suit the less developed until they were well past where the developed 
countries now are. Economic policies that would push consumption in 
a sustainable direction can indeed be devised, but so far the path that 
consumption will take seems to be determined by its own laws. 
Will not good economic and ecological regulations and sound tax 
systems direct the economy into an environmentally viable trajectory? 
They would, but people do not vote for good rules that cause departures 
from the consumption pattern they want. Thus it is difficult to legislate 
sound policies in a democracy, and for other reasons they are even less 
likely to be imposed in a dictatorship. If we have one piece of 
empirically backed knowledge, it is that bad policies are widespread and 
persistent. Social science has to take account of them. 
Other Effects of Large and Growing Population 
The case against rapid population growth has been made on grounds 
that have nothing to do with either economic growth or environment. 
Intuition suggests that population pressures lead to war, and the eminent 
group recently sponsored by the American Assembly declared in its final 
report: 
In many developing countries, population pressures on the 
land threaten national security as people migrate in search 
of sustenance, aggravating territorial disputes and often 
creating violent conflict.129 
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Choucri130 concludes from her data that "the direct link between 
density and violent behavior has been found to be weak," but on the 
other hand "density does appear to have a substantial impact on 
international violence through a complex causal chain." 
If international wars are not immediately attributable to 
population growth, internal rebellions are so attributable, according to 
a number of studies. The well-known dynastic cycle in China is 
commonly associated by scholars with population: Population growth 
leads to a gradual fall in income per head, until eventually the surplus 
over bare subsistence is insufficient to provide for the ruling class and 
its military instruments of control, and after a period of brigandage and 
local warlords a new dynasty seizes power. Usher studies the historical 
data and finds that it confirms a simple logic: 
In a society of farmers, rulers, and bandits, population 
growth simultaneously impoverishes farmers and reduces 
the ruler's surplus .... Society evolves into a despotic 
stationary state or into a dynastic cycle, depending on 
whether poverty among farmers chokes off population 
growth before the surplus shrinks to the point where rulers 
turn to banditry.131 
The disappearance of the surplus not only deprives the rulers of luxury, 
but more important it deprives them of the armed forces that can 
maintain order through the empire. The mechanism in question has 
129 Mathews, op. cit. 
130 Choucri, Nazli. 1974. Population Dynamics and International Violence, p. 60. 
Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books. 
131 Usher, Dan. 1989. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State." American 
Economic Review 79(5):1,031-44. 
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some resemblance to Nelson's132 low-level trap models of the 
persistence of underdevelopment, as Usher points out. To me it 
resembles the theory of lbn Khaldun, derived from his experience in the 
Middle East and North Africa, except that lbn Khaldun gave special 
attention to the incapacity of later generations of rulers in each cycle. 
So much for China. Jack Goldstone shows with data for Britain, 
tracing rebellions over several centuries, that rebellions were almost 
invariably preceded by a rise in the price of grain, which was due to 
increased population in a stationary agriculture. 
Beyond that, and more peaceful, a long tradition of research and 
writing is based on the comparison of individuals born in large and those 
born in small families. Children born to couples having only one or two 
come out better in many kinds of tests. A recent book by Blake133 
presents the classical case and adds new evidence. 
And even if none of these assertions were true in a causal sense 
(though all are based on perfectly valid correlations), there would be a 
case for birth control if people want to use it. That in fact is what the 
NAS report ends up with as the chief argument for providing 
contraceptive information and supplies: Every couple has a right to as 
few or as many children as it wishes. That sounds fair enough, until one 
meets up with the parallel assertion that every child has the right to 
adequate nutrition. Suppose the world is made in such a way that these 
two rights cannot both exist once density goes above a certain point? 
Such incompatibilities of moral principles are not usually acknowledged 
in official documents. 
Envoi 
The conclusion of most academic economists from their current 
theoretical work and the data adduced in its support is that population 
132 Nelson, Richard R. 1956. "A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in 
Underdeveloped Economies." American Economic Review 46:894-908 (December). 
133 Blake, Judith. 1989. Family Size and Achievement. Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press. 
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growth does not greatly handicap economic development. Without 
opposing that result, one has to point out that the argument does not 
take into account the impact of humans on the biosphere, which is 
equivalent to saying that the conclusion applies in an infinite world. It 
is the finiteness of the ecosphere in all its dimensions to which biologists 
draw attention. 
For various reasons this finiteness is only now coming to be 
important. Only now are we having to recognize the ozone layer, carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, extinction of species, waste, and 
desertification. In the past, populations were small enough, incomes low 
enough, and technologies innocuous enough that the effect of humans 
on the ecosphere could be neglected, i.e., the ecosphere was effectively 
infinite. One unfortunate effect of this transition to a finite world is that 
data drawn from the past tell little about the world of the twenty-first 
century, when present trends will make that finiteness more and more 
felt. 
Like every other branch of social science, ours is confounded by 
the central place of interpretation in human affairs. The great obstacle 
to explanation and forecasting is that so much depends on how people 
look at their situations. If they can anticipate prospective crowding and 
its discomforts, and accordingly limit their numbers as Malthus urged, 
that gives rise to one demographic condition; if they see themselves as 
needing children for support in their individual old age, or collectively 
as warriors, that leads to something different. Examples of the former 
have been turned up by anthropologists among preliterates, including the 
hunters and gatherers of the Kalahari Desert.134 The !Kung have as 
simple a culture as exists anywhere, with no writing, no state, and 
certainly no economic development, but their reproductive behavior is 
such as not to disturb their leisurely lives (they work only two or three 
days a week); certainly the stability of their relation to their environment 
depends on having few children. The !Kung are not the only (or 
necessarily the best) example of preindustrial population control. Wulf 
134 Howell, Nancy. 1979. Demography of the Dobe !Kung. New York: Academic 
Press. 
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Schiefenhovel135 describes clearly deliberate control among the Eipo 
of Irian Jaya, and Napoleon Chagnon136 the same among the 
Y anomamo of the Amazon. The French peasantry of the nineteenth 
century are well known for birth control without equipment. At the 
other extreme are rural Kenyans and Pakistani hill tribes, with their very 
large families and rapid increase. 
Thus two tribes, similar in physical environment and social 
structure, can differ in fertility and other practices because they interpret 
their situations differently. We do not like to think of those subjective 
understandings, for as such they are beyond the reach of science. We 
take it as a matter of faith that subjective elements are controlled by 
objective conditions, but the relation of the subjective interpretation to 
the surrounding world is often ambiguous. That is what makes possible 
the several disciplines of social science. The !Kung and a hill tribe in 
Pakistan, economists and biologists, look at population differently. Some 
put one set of variables into their models, others use other variables. 
Scholars as well as the people they study have their different ways of 
interpreting the world! 
Perhaps Perlman137 had something of this in mind when he 
wrote: "If we use antinatalist programs, we do so for reasons other than 
those simply offered by what we as economists now know." 
A truly interdisciplinary treatment would systematically integrate those 
other reasons. 
135 SchiefenhOvel, Wulf. 1984. "Preferential Female Infanticide and Other 
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